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Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of data integrity
attacks (DIAs) on cooperative economic dispatch of distributed
generators (DGs) in an AC microgrid. To establish resiliency
against such attacks and ensure optimal operation, a localized
event driven attack-resilient scheme is proposed. Most of the
existing works examine neighboring information to infer the
presence of DIAs, where the detection is limited to events such
as multiple link failures. Two kinds of DIAs are considered
in this paper – namely fault and random attacks, which are
segregated based on the final values of consensus updates. Firstly,
to improve the robustness of the detection theory, a localized
resilient control update is designed by modeling each DG with
a reference incremental cost. Secondly, an event driven control
signal is generated for the local incremental cost and held upon
detection of attacks, to prevent malicious data from propagating
to the neighboring nodes. The proposed strategy acts immediately
upon detection of data integrity attack to ensure maximization in
the economic profit. Further, the proposed detection approach is
theoretically verified and validated using simulation conditions.
Index Terms—AC microgrid, resilient control, data integrity
attack, cooperative control.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENERGY management system (EMS) is an effectivemechanism to handle the generation profiles of different
sources while attaining their maximum economical benefits
[1]. Since renewable energy sources are rapidly being inte-
grated into modern power systems, the complexity in solving
multi-objective EMSs increases significantly owing to their
intermittent nature [2]. To this end, microgrids have been
identified as key enablers behind integration of renewable
energy sources owing to the flexibility of their operation
in both grid-connected and islanded modes [3]. To date,
generation dispatching is usually carried out in a centralized
manner to minimize the operational cost using hierarchical
stages of optimization including, integer programming [4],
artificial intelligence based techniques [5], etc. To achieve
more flexibility in control under transmission delay and infor-
mation failure, cooperative/distributed controllers with robust
performance towards cyber layer imperfections are preferred
in recent times [6]. They establish a scalable platform with
an even distribution of the computational resources across
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the network. This preempts into increasing the reliability of
operation by implementing cooperative control in microgrids
to form cooperative microgrids. Meanwhile, many cooperative
energy management schemes have been devised to incur
significant reduction in the power management cost and carbon
emissions [7]-[8]. In contrast to the operation in longer time
scales with static demand input in the centralized scheme,
cooperative dispatching also allows online actions for every
load change in real-time [9]- [10]. As a result, it improves the
economic profile of the generators in a given duration.
The primary assumption is that the economic dispatch (ED)
operation is conducted in a reliable cyber network reporting
true measurements [11]-[12]. Any physical violation or er-
roneous measurement in the EMS can cause the microgrid
to operate in non-optimal and non-feasible manner [13]-[17].
Cyber attacks using illegitimate data intrusion into the EMS
can interrupt optimal dispatching of sources in a microgrid.
As a consequence, such events entail increase in the total
generation cost.
Considerably less effort has gone into analyzing cyber
attacks in cooperative optimization. To name a few, the authors
in [18] have designed a reputation-based detection algorithm
to detect attacks on the ED problem. However, it is not fully
cooperative, as the algorithm requires a centralized control
center. These centralized mechanisms are highly prone to
single point-of-failure, which can easily disrupt the optimal
operation of the system. A similar hypothesis on the economic
impact of DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF) under cyber
attacks is studied in [19]. In this study, cooperative ED behaves
in a different manner as opposed to DC-OPF, following the
global equality constraint for power balancing. To increase the
generation cost, any adversarial false data in the cooperative
ED optimization model is categorized as a data integrity attack
(DIA) in this paper. Such attacks alter the power flows with
respect to the optimal solution.
From the perspective of an adversary, the goal is to increase
the generation cost by hacking critical parameters and leading
to a reduction in the energy efficiency of the system [20]. The
goal of cooperative real-time ED is to ensure that the final
state of convergence leads to unbiased operation inside the
constrained optimization space. However, data intrusion from
stealth attacks is possible, as demonstrated in [9]. Such attacks
are capable of increasing the generation cost without causing
any obvious indications of power imbalance. Moreover, Zeng,
et. al. in [21] have modeled a DIA to manipulate the power
dispatch of each generator to gain monetary benefits. To for-
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Fig. 1. A single-line diagram of a cyber-physical AC microgrid consisting of N DGs managed by a cooperative cyber topology. The data integrity attack is
highlighted in red to change the cost parameters, affecting the optimal operation.
mulate an attack-resilient mechanism, a two-hop neighboring
information based verification algorithm to detect and restore
the system from DIAs is reported in [22]. This algorithm is
capable of detecting non-optimal and non-feasible solutions
simultaneously. Nevertheless, its performance is highly depen-
dent on the information from multiple neighbors, which may
be a problem in cases of compromised link or link failure.
Another limitation is that the detection approach is overly
dependent on the network communication delay, which can
hinder the subsequent corrective actions. Hence, the scheme
suffers from coordinated attacks on the cyber links such as
denial of service (DoS) [23] and man-in-the-middle (MITM)
[24] attacks.
To address these limitations in the literature, this paper
proposes a unified and localized attack-resilient model to
prevent the impact of DIAs in cooperative AC microgrid. Two
attack models have been considered, namely fault and random
attacks. Basically, fault attacks cause an implicit change in cost
parameters, which maloperates as per the dynamic consensus
theory to reach an arbitrary value. To prevent the system
from such attacks, a resilient control update is designed using
the error in local measurements to cancel the effect of the
mentioned attack. On the other hand, as random attacks do
not update with the iterations, a localized estimation of the
incremental cost model is computed using a reference model
to obtain the error in cost parameters. An error in the cost
parameters triggers an event for the same node, indicating
a DIA in the node. To protect against random attacks, a
localized event driven incremental cost data is held by the
controller using the local measurements from the pre-triggered
instant. As a result, the propagation of the attack element to
the neighbors is prohibited and the held value ensures the
optimal operation. This scheme serves two advantages: 1) the
privacy of each unit is secured, 2) it operates without involving
neighboring measurements, and hence remain unaffected by
adversarial actions such as delays, link failure, DoS and MITM
attacks. As opposed to the existing resilient schemes studied
in [21]-[22], the proposed localized event-driven mechanism is
impervious to cyber intrusions such as failure or cyber attack
on a cyber link. This enhances the security of cooperative
microgrids against data integrity attacks. Moreover, the pro-
posed attack-resilient concept can be extended to cooperative
grid-connected distribution systems. To sum up, the basic
contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) A unified localized attack-resilient scheme is proposed
to maintain optimality and feasibility of cooperative eco-
nomic dispatch in AC microgrid. To the best of authors’
knowledge, the proposed localized event driven resilient
scheme has never been proposed in the realm of detecting
DIAs in cooperative systems.
2) For fault attacks, a resilient control update is designed
only using the localized error of change in cost pa-
rameters to diminish its effect. It is not susceptible to
intermittent conditions or adversaries causing multiple
link failures.
3) For random attacks, a localized event driven solution is
used to hold the estimated value upon detection of the
attack. As a result, it improves the robustness of the
system to operate in its optimal state even under attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II details
out the cooperative active power control of AC microgrid.
Using the defined theory in Section II, the problem of stealth
data integrity attacks is formulated in Section III with a case
study. It also provides a theoretical analysis to establish that
the abovementioned attack cause an increase in generation
cost. Further, Section IV depicts the proposed attack resilient
scheme. It has been verified using simulation cases, which are
demonstrated in Section V. Finally, Section VI provides the
concluding remarks.
II. COOPERATIVE ARCHITECTURE AND CONTROL OF AC
MICROGRID
This paper considers an autonomous AC microgrid with N
distributed generators (DGs), as shown in Fig. 1. It operates
using two hierarchical layers, namely primary and secondary
layer. Since it utilizes cooperative control mechanism, the
secondary controller operates using local and neighboring
measurements only.
For the purpose of brevity of this paper, the basic equations
of power controller and the low-pass filter used in autonomous
inverter based systems can be referred from [6]. In the cyber
layer, an undirected graph is considered, where vertices denote
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the points of connections of physical DGs. Since the scope
of the paper is based on mitigating data integrity attacks
which alter the active power commands to disregard optimal
power dispatch, only the measurements concerning active
power secondary control layer are considered after this point.
More details on reactive power sharing and average voltage
regulation using distributed control in islanded microgrids can
be referred from [25].
A. Cyber Preliminaries
Each vertex sends and receive ψj = {λj} from its neigh-
boring vertices to achieve optimal power dispatch, where
λj denotes the incremental cost of the neighboring agents.
Additionally, P outk and ωi denote the measured active power
and frequency of ith DG, which are used locally. The de-
tailed equations of the cost function of each DG and its
implementation will be covered later in the paper. Each agent
is represented via a node and a communication digraph via
edges using an adjacency matrix A = [aij ] ε RN×N . The
communication weights are given by:
aij =
{
h, if (xi, xj) ε E
0, else
where h denotes a positive quantity, E is an edge connecting
two nodes, with xi and xj being the local and neighboring
node respectively. Mathematically, the incoming information
matrix can be denoted by Zin =
∑
i ε N aij . Hence, if both
matrices match each other, the Laplacian matrix L is balanced,
where L = Zin − A and its elements are given by:
lij =

deg(ni) , i = j
−1 , i 6= j
0 , otherwise
(1)
where deg(ni) is the degree of ith agent.
Remark I: As per the synchronization law [31], all the agents
participating in cooperative control will achieve consensus
using ẋ = −Lx for a well-spanned matrix L such that
lim
t→∞
xi(t) = c, ∀i ε N , where c is the steady-state reference
and N is the number of agents.
B. Cooperative Control of AC Microgrid
As per the conventional droop control theory for au-
tonomous DGs, the active power in ith DG is controlled using:
ωmi = ω
∗ −mi∆P pui (2)
where mi and ω∗ denote the active power droop gain and
global frequency reference in the considered system respec-
tively. Further, ∆P pui =
P outi −P
∗
i
Pmaxi
, where Pmaxi is the max-
imum active power in ith DG. To achieve different control
paradigms, the hierarchical controller is interfaced into the
primary control layer accordingly. Since primary controller
always operates with an error, secondary controllers are
employed to compensate the error for the abovementioned
undirected cyber graph using the local and the neighboring
information, as highlighted in Fig. 1.
The active power control in each DG is augmented with
frequency restoration to minimize the generation cost for
economic operation. To this end, we consider the general
quadratic cost function for each DG to provide the operational
cost, given by:
Ci(Pi) = aiP
2
i + biPi + ci (3)
where ai, bi and ci are the cost coefficients of ith DG.
Following the generation-demand balance equality constraint,
the objective of optimal load sharing is to minimize the total
cost of all DGs using:
min C(P ) =
N∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) (4)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Pi = P
D, Pmini < Pi < P
max
i , ∀iεN
where PD, Pmini and P
min
i denotes the total demand in the
microgrid, minimum and maximum active power for ith DG
respectively. Further, (4) can be solved using its associated
Lagrange function as:
Lλ =
N∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) + λi
N∑
i=1
(PDi − Pi) (5)
where λi and PDi denote the Lagrangian operator and local
active power demand respectively. Differentiating (5) with
respect to Pi using the first-order optimality condition, we
can initialize the incremental cost using:
Pi(0) =

Pmini , P
D
i < P
min
i
PDi , P
min
i < P
D
i < P
max
i
Pmaxi , P
D
i > P
max
i
λi(0) = 2aiPi(0) + bi
ηi(0) = P
D
i − Pi(0)
(6)
To minimize the total generation cost subjecting to the
equality constraints, it is required that the incremental cost
of each DG be equal [26], which is carried out using a power
correction term ∆Pi, given by:
∆Ṗi =
∑
j ε Ni
aij(λj − λi) (7)
Using (7), the active power reference for each DG with
regulation of the local frequency can be obtained using:
P ∗i = P
initial
i + ki
∫
(ω∗ − ωi(t)) + ∆Pi. (8)
Substituting (8) in (2), the active power droop control law
operates to restore frequency of each bus to the rated value
and participates in optimal load sharing. Hence using (2)-
(8), a unified cooperative control structure for active power
is devised for AC microgrid. However, any change in cost
parameters or displace the incremental cost in (6) by an
adversary, denoted as a data integrity attack (DIA), will cause
the system to operate in an non-optimal state. As a result,
such attacks reduce the energy efficiency, which needs to
be identified and mitigated immediately. Hence, the system
response under such attacks is studied in detail in the following
section.
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III. MODELING OF DATA INTEGRITY ATTACKS
In this section, we first study the modeling of DIA in a
cooperative microgrid. Secondly, the online stealthiness of
such attacks to reach non-optimal state considering bounded
generation is demonstrated using a case study. Moreover, the
deviation of the cost function under attacks is verified in this
section.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Comparative evaluation of (a) active power, and (b) incremental cost
of DGs under no attack (solid lines) and DIA attack (dotted lines) – Change
in cost parameters causes a drift in the convergence of incremental cost λ
causing a non-optimal operation.
Two types of DIAs have been considered, namely fault and
random based attacks. Basically in the fault DIA, the local
incremental cost λi is updated with every iteration using:
λi(k + 1) = λi(k) +
∑
j ε Ni
wij(λj(k)− λi(k)) + ζuaλi (9)
where uaλi is an exogenous attack input in i
th DG and ζ is a
binary variable which is equal to 1 in the presence of DIA, or
otherwise. This can be done by changing the cost parameters
in the local DG using:
uaλi =
{
−∆aiPi
−∆bi
(10)
where ∆ai and ∆bi denote positive attack elements, when
added to the cost parameters in (10) increase the generation
cost per unit power and fixed cost, respectively. Using (10),
it can be concluded that the consensus algorithm maloperates
during the updating process to converge to an arbitrary value.
Such attacks are only possible when the compromised value
of the incremental cost is used locally and in the neighboring
units, to provide a symmetric effect along the Laplacian
graph. On the other hand for random attacks, which are also
commonly referred as the byzantine attacks [27], the current
estimate is substituted to another value, which hinders the
update process for each iteration. Using the random DIA, λi
settles down to a constant value using a set of attack elements,
given by:
λi(k) = (1− κ)λi(k) + κλci (11)
where κ = 1 denote the presence of random DIA, or otherwise.
Moreover, λci denotes a constant valued attack element, which
does not update in an iterative manner. It behaves as a constant
value in the dynamic consensus theory, providing arbitrary
changes for the remaining DGs. More details on byzantine
attacks in misbehaving agents are given in [28], [29].
Similar definition of both considered attacks can be found
in [30]. In this study, the attacks are resolved using a two-
hop neighborhood algorithm. However, this scheme is highly
vulnerable to DoS or MITM attacks in the cyber layer since
the incremental cost received from the neighbors could be
compromised.
Using (4)-(8), the secondary controller objectives for eco-
nomic dispatch in microgrids using a cooperative cyber graph
can be written (detailed control formulation is presented in
[10]) as:
lim
t→∞
λi(t) = λ
opt, lim
t→∞
Pi(t) = P
opt ∀ i ∈ N (12)
where λopt and P opt denote the optimal incremental cost
and active power in the absence of attack elements, respec-
tively. However in the presence of cyber attacks, the attacker
may cause scenarios leading to generation-demand imbalance,
giving divergent solutions for (8). Such attacks may easily
expose the attacker following the extended concepts of syn-
chronization law in [31]. It is worth notifying that the attacks
considered in this paper operate under the optimization space
bounded by the constraints in (4). Hence, the adversary can
cause online stealth attacks modeled using (10)-(11), to get:
lim
t→∞
λi(t) = λ
a∗, lim
t→∞
Pi(t) = P
a∗ ∀ i ∈ N (13)
where λa∗ and P a∗ denote the optimal incremental cost and
active power in the presence of attack elements, respectively.
Moreover since λopt 6= λa∗, the system converges to a non-
optimal state due to the attack thereby, reducing the overall
generation cost efficiency. The convergence analysis within the
constraints in the presence of such attacks can be referred from
[9].
In cooperative ED problem, as long as the error in (7)
between the incremental cost of local agents and neighbors
is zero, the system operator in every agent would seemingly
believe that an optimal solution is always reached. Therefore,
determination of such attacks in cooperative networks is a
challenging task.
To provide with the basic understanding of such attacks, a
case study on a microgrid with N = 4 DGs in Fig. 2 is done
using a fault attack using increase in the cost parameters of
DG I. It can be seen that the system response is similar in both
cases, in the absence of attack (represented by solid lines) and
in the presence of attack (represented by dotted lines). The
realism behind its operation under such attacks is unknown,
when seen from a given agent since adequate information
on the total active power demand is not centrally available.
Moreover, it can be seen in Fig. 2(b) that the steady state
value of the incremental cost initially under attacks is raised
by 0.85 $/W, and it increased to 1.05 $/W with the increase in
load at t = 1.5 s. It clearly suggests that minimization of (4) is
violated under attacks. Hence, the abovementioned case study
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raises serious concerns on detecting and mitigation of such
attacks in cooperative microgrid, since the local neighborhood
error in (7) converges to zero.
Considering the problem formulation of data integrity at-
tacks in microgrids using (13), a theoretical analysis is pro-
vided to estimate the final generation under attack (in only one
node) and its difference with the optimal generation cost under
no attack. The analysis is separately carried out for active
power generation within and outside the limits in (6).
A. Inside the Bounds [Pmini , P
max
i ]
Rearranging the equality constraint in (4), the final settling
value of incremental cost under attack using (6) can be written
as:
lim
t→∞
λi(t) = λ
a∗ =
∑
iεN P
D
i −
∑
iεN α
a∗
i∑
iεN β
a∗
i
(14)
where αa∗i = αi+α
a
i and β
a∗
i = βi+β
a
i . Moreover, αi =
−bi
2ai
,
βi =
1
2ai
and αai , β
a
i are the attacked elements to change the
cost parameters of ith DG. As discussed above, such attacks
can be categorized as fault attacks, where the convergence is
feasible, however to a non-optimal setpoint. On the other hand,
for no attack, the steady state of incremental cost using (10)
can be given by:
lim
t→∞
λi(t) = λ
opt =
∑
iεN P
D
i −
∑
iεN αi∑
iεN βi
(15)
Substituting (15) in (14), we get:
λa∗i =
λi
∑
iεN βi − αai∑
iεN βi + β
a
i
(16)
Rearranging terms in (16), we get:
λa∗i β
a
i = (λ
opt
i − λ
a∗
i )
∑
i ε N
βai − αai (17)
Denoting (4) in terms of αi, βi and γi, the operating cost can
be expressed as:
Ci(Pi) =
(Pi − αi)2
2βi
+ γi (18)
where γi = ci − b
2
i
4ai
. Furthermore, using (14)-(18), the cost
function under attacks Cai is given by:
Cai (P
a
i ) =
(λa∗i β
a∗
i + α
a
i )
2
2βi
+ γi (19)
Substituting (17) in (19), we get:
Cai (P
a
i ) =
[λa∗i β
a
i + (λ
opt
i − λa∗i )
∑
iεN βi]
2
2βi
+ γi (20)
Under no attack, (18), the cost function can be simply written
as Ci(Pi) =
(βiλ
opt)2
2βi
+ γi. Moreover, the difference between
the cost function under attack and no attack can be formulated
as:
Cai (P
a
i )− Ci(Pi)
=
[λa∗i β
a
i + (λ
opt
i − λ
a∗
i )
∑
iεN βi]
2 − (βiλopt)2
2βi
(21)
=
[(βai +
∑
iεN βi)λ
opt + (βai −
∑
iεN βi)λ
a∗]
2βi
(22)
However, since the cost parameters in the non-attacked nodes
are unchanged, the difference in the cost function only due to
the non-optimal incremental cost λa∗ is given by:
Ci(Pi)− C∗i (P ai ) =
βi[λ
opt2 − λa∗2]
2
. (23)
Using (22)-(23), we get:∑
iεN,i6=ia
[Ci(Pi)− C∗i (P ai )] + Ci(Pi)− Cai (P ai ) =
(βai −
∑
iεN βi)(
∑
iεN βi)(λ
opt − λa∗)2
2βi
(24)
Remark II: Using (24), it is sufficient to prove that the cost
function without and with an attack will be different since
λa∗ 6= λopt. Since the change in cost parameters can induce
fault attacks, it can also be concluded from (24) that large
error deviation in (λopt−λa∗) using random attacks explicitly
causes large deviation in the cost parameters of the attacked
node.
B. Outside the Bounds [Pmini , P
max
i ]
As the objective function in (4) is closely convex, there exist
only one solution for P opt and consequently λopt. Suppose
there exists no αai and β
a
i , which can change the optimal
setpoint. As a result, the incremental cost and active power
under attacks will satisfy λa∗i = λ
opt
i and P
a∗
i = P
opt
i . Hence,
P a∗i =

Pmaxi , λ
a∗
i ≥ λmax
a
i
βa∗i λ
a∗ + αa∗i , λ
mina
i < λ
a∗
i < λ
maxa
i
Pmini , λ
a∗
i ≤ λmin
a
i
=

Pmaxi , λ
opt
i ≥ λmaxi
βiλ
opt + αi, λ
min
i < λ
opt
i < λ
max
i
Pmini , λ
opt
i ≤ λmini
(25)
holds true, where λmini =
1
βi
Pmini − αiβi , λ
max
i =
1
βi
Pmaxi −
αi
βi
, λmin
a
i =
1
βa∗i
Pmin
a
i −
αa∗i
βa∗i
and λmax
a
i =
1
βa∗i
Pmax
a
i −
αa∗i
βa∗i
. However, it can be observed that αai and β
a
i must exist
and thus, (25) does not hold. This justifies that the operation
outside the active power generation bounds due to DIAs is not
possible as the unique solution for incremental cost is always
bounded between [Pmini , P
max
i ] for i
th agent.
Remark III: The optimality is lost when the mentioned
attacks are injected into any of the nodes, even though a
feasible solution is reached for a given loading condition.
The deviation of total generation caused by these attacks are
highly dependent on the magnitude of attack elements and
the generation bounds. Meanwhile, the cost parameters aren’t
consistent for every DG, which suggests different manipulation
ranges for each node.
As a result from a techno-economic perspective, such at-
tacks cause reduction in energy efficiency. Hence, a localized
event based attack resilient mechanism is proposed in this
paper to defend the system against such attacks.
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IV. PROPOSED LOCALIZED EVENT DRIVEN ATTACK
RESILIENT MECHANISM
A. Design of Attack Resilient Mechanism
The basic philosophy behind the proposed scheme lies with
the model-based event detection, which identifies the change
of parameters in the cost function model. It should be noted
that an event driven mechanism under conventional schemes
is applicable to reduce the communication burden. By this
definition, the updated data in case of events, such as load
change, is transmitted to the neighboring DGs, which serves as
an economic option as compared to the time-triggered schemes
[33]. However since this paper is focused on identifying and
mitigating DIAs, the proposed strategy is designed in a manner
such that it operates using local measurements only during the
events, i.e., attacks.
Definition 1: An event can be defined as an element in the
control system which is responsible for causing any significant
changes in model parameters. Hence, detection of such events
has been used to alleviate security.
Using (24) and Definition 1, it can be proved that a DIA in
any unit qualifies as a localized event. To detect such events,
a reference model of the cost function is defined within the
limits [λmini , λ
max
i ], which is given by:
λri (t) = 2a
r
iPi(t) + b
r
i (26)
where •r denote the reference value of a quantity using the
local active power measurement. Since the reference model of
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Fig. 3. Control diagram of the proposed attack resilient controller for ith
DG to defend against data integrity attacks - attack on the communicated λ
(random) as well as on the local control input (fault).
the cost function is always constant for a DG, the local active
power measurement is used to estimate the cost parameters
to determine the possibility of an event. Hence, the estimated
cost parameters for operation within the active power bound
[Pmini , P
max
i ] and the incremental cost bound [λ
min
i , λ
max
i ]
are given by:
âi(t) =
λi(t)− bri
2Pi(t)
(27)
b̂i(t) = λi(t)− 2ariPi(t) (28)
where •̂ denote the estimated value of the cost parameters.
Using (24)-(28), any attack on the cost parameter can be identi-
fied by monitoring non-zero values for the model identification
error, calculated using:
ãi(t) = a
r
i − âi(t) (29)
b̃i(t) = b
r
i − b̂i(t) (30)
where •̃ denote the model identification error set of the cost
parameters. Hence by definition, the model identification error
is used to determine such attacks and is also a necessary
criteria to trigger localized events.
Definition 2: Any non-zero value in the online model identi-
fication of the cost parameters in ith DG indicate that a data
integrity attack is conducted in the same unit.
Using Definition 2, attack based events Ξ are detected
locally using:
Ξ =
{
0, if ||ρi|| ≤ ē
1, else
(31)
where ρi = [ãi, b̃i]. Similar to the event-triggered philosophy
[33], the event is triggered when ||ρi(t)|| reaches the upper
bound ē, or updates to zero when otherwise. Using (31) as
the event-triggering criterion, a localized estimation of λ̂i is
done using the reference cost parameters using:
λ̂i(t) = 2a
r
iPi(t) + b
r
i , t ε [t
ρi
k , t
ρi
k+1] (32)
where [tρik , t
ρi
k+1] are the consecutive triggered instants. A two-
fold validation in addition with (31) is done to identify the
presence of such attacks, which can be ensured using:
λ̃i(t) = λ̂i(t
λi
k )− λi(t) (33)
Additionally, any non-zero value for ||λ̃i|| also indicates the
presence of an attack. Hence, an attack resilient update λrui is
designed for ith DG using:
λrui (t) = ||λ̃||σi (t)(ãi(t) + b̃i(t)) (34)
where σ is a scaling factor. As a result, the update obtained
in (34) is used as a correction factor to obtain the final
incremental cost λfi , given by:
λfi (t) = λi(t) + λ
ru
i (t) (35)
Algorithm 1: Resilient Mechanism for Fault and Ran-
dom Attacks
ζ = 0;
while (||ρ|| < ē) && (ζ == 1) do
Check (31);
if attack == fault then
The resilient update in (34) operates
immediately;
Link DisableN = No;
else
Link DisableN = Yes;
(32) operates for the attacked agent;
end
end
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Remark IV: The resilient update diminishes the effect of
change in parameters using the large difference in (33) as an
adaptive gain. This gain can be scaled up by increasing the
value of σ. As a result, the final change in cost parameters
taking into account the resilient update minimizes following a
fault attack. Finally, the incremental cost obtained in (35) can
be used in (7) for the respective DGs to defend against such
attacks.
However in case of random attacks, the attacked DG con-
troller does not update (7), which as a consequence assigns λci
as the reference to be tracked by other DGs. For unprecedented
values of λci causing an random attack, the solutions may
diverge leading to stability issues and over generation sce-
narios for DG(s). To briefly summarize the proposed resilient
control strategy, Algorithm I is provided with sign conventions
attack and fault denoting the system operation states.
Moreover, Link DisableN denotes disabling the cyber link
with the neighbors. Since the event generation process is also
co-aligned with the existing secondary controller, it is vital to
inspect the stability of the algorithm.
B. Stability Analysis
To obtain input-to-state stability, we consider a quadratic
Lyapunov candidate V for the system, where V = xTPx with
x = [P, ω,∆P, λ]. It is important to regard the state feedback
law u = −Kx to design V , where the inputs can be deemed
as the cooperative secondary outputs using Laplacian matrix
L as the input matrix [6]. To establish stability, a positive-
definite matrix Q with φQ as its smallest singular value can
be defined as:
(A+BK)TP1 + P1(A+BK) = −Q (36)
where P1 is a positive-definite matrix. More details on the state
and input matrices can be referred from the detailed small-
signal model of cooperative AC microgrids in [32]. Taking
the derivative of V , we get
V̇ = xT [(A+BK)P + P (A+BK)]x+ 2xTPBKρ (37)
= xT [(Â+ B̂K + Ã+ B̃K)TP +
+P (Â+ B̂K + Ã+ B̃K)]x+ 2xTP (B̂ + B̃)Kρ (38)
where Â, B̂ and Ã, B̃ consist of the estimated and model
identification error of cost parameters in (27)-(28) and (29)-
(30) respectively. Substituting (36) in (38), we get:
V̇ = −xTQx+ xT [(Ã+ B̃K)TP + P (Ã+ B̃K)]x
+2xTP (B̂ + B̃)Kρ (39)
Upper-bounding (39), we get:
V̇ ≤ (−φ+ 4ēLP )||x||2 + 2ēLP ||x||||ρ|| (40)
To achieve asymptotic stability, (40) is equated to zero, we
get:
||ρ|| ≤ φQ − 2ēLP
ēLP
||x|| (41)
Remark V: In (41), it is intuitive to follow that the event-
triggering is dependent on the model identification error space,
TABLE I
COST COEFFICIENTS OF DG
DG I II III IV
a 0.005 0.0025 0.004 0.006
b 1 0.6 1.8 0.45
governed by the value of ē. A lower the value of ē corresponds
to a higher sensitivity using the proposed mechanism and vice-
versa.
Remark VI: It should be noted that since the cooperative
controllers are equipped to work under the bounded space of
active power generation, the proposed resilient mechanism will
perform satisfactorily regardless of the attack signal amplitude.
Since the value of ē is very small, any increase in the
incremental cost beyond ē due to a DIA will immediately be
subjected to the compensating action by the resilient update.
A detailed performance evaluation for different values of
ē is provided in the next section. Finally, the proposed attack
resilient mechanism, as shown in Fig. 3, can be used to defend
the system against likely data integrity attacks to disrupt
optimal operation of microgrid.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
DG I
DG II DG III
DG IV
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1
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Fig. 4. Single-line diagram of the physical AC microgrid and its correspond-
ing cyber graph (dashed arrows).
The proposed localized event based attack-resilient control
strategy is tested on an AC microgrid, as shown in Fig.
4, with N = 4 DGs of equal capacity of 10 kVA. The
nominal frequency of the network is 60 Hz. A distributed
secondary controller is employed to regulate the error of
incremental cost and frequency between the local as well as
the neighboring DGs. The ith DG is connected to the jth
DG via line parameters given by Rij and Lij . It should be
noted that each DG has different cost function parameters.
All the plant and control parameters are provided in Appendix.
The cost coefficients of each DG are tabulated in Table I. All
the scenarios have been discussed in MATLAB/SIMULINK
environment.
Firstly, a case study on the considered system is carried
out in Fig. 5(a), where λ1 is substituted to a value of 7.8
using (11) by the adversary at t = 0.5 s. It can be seen that
as soon as λ1 settles to 7.8, the remaining DGs track the set-
point as a reference using the consensus theory. Under such
circumstances, the propagation of λci is first stopped by dis-
abling the cyber link to the neighboring DGs. Upon securing
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Performance of AC microgrid (a) without, and (b) with the proposed
attack detection scheme for random attacks at t = 0.5 s in DG I: λ̂1 is
immediately held upon the detection of attack.
the operation of the remaining DGs, owing to the large error
in (33), the event-generated λ̂i is instead used locally in the
attacked DG. By doing so, the local neighborhood error in (7)
converges back to zero in the steady-state. Additionally, when
the model identification error ρi settles back within the bounds
indicating that the attack element is dismissed, the links to the
neighboring units are restored back for normal operation. As
per the explained theory, it can be seen that λ1 immediately
reverts back to the normal operating conditions obeying the
consensus theory in Fig. 5(b) using the proposed mechanism.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 6. Performance evaluation of AC microgrid (a) without any resilient
incentive, (b) with constant gain ξ = 5, (c) proposed controller using (34) for
σ = 0.6 and (d) σ = 1.4 for an attack at t = 1 s on DG I.
Further, the performance evaluation of the AC microgrid
under an adaptive scaling factor multiplied to the model
identification errors in (34) is carried out. A comparative
assessment using various alternatives is presented in Fig. 6.
The attack signal amplitude could be large, which may lead
to a large change in the active power dispatch from DGs and
may unnecessarily reach the maximum/minimum active power
generation bounds. When b1 is increased by a larger quantity,
i.e. around 6 times at t = 1 s, it can be seen in Fig. 6(a) that the
incremental cost of each DG converge around 7.6 $/W from a
steady state-value of 6.3 $/W without any resilient incentives.
Further in Fig. 6(b), when a constant gain ξ = 5 is multiplied
to [ãi(t) + b̃i(t)] in (34), it can be seen that an appreciable
attenuation is achieved for the same attack as compared to
Fig. 6(a). It can be seen that the final convergence in Fig. 6(b)
upon the attack reaches 6.6 $/W. Since the performance of a
constant gain-based resilient mechanism will vary for different
attack signal amplitudes, this scheme is highly dependent on
the design of ξ. On the other hand, an anticipatory measure of
the impact of DIA can be realized using (33), which monitors
the change in incremental cost upon an attack. As the change
in incremental cost is proportional to the amplitude of attack
elements, it provides a direct correlation to design the resilient
update. This can be clearly seen in Fig. 6(d), where the
attenuation increases when σ = 1.4 since the steady-state point
of incremental cost didn’t get altered even in the presence of
attacks. However for σ < 1 in Fig. 6(c), a minor shift of 0.05
$/W in incremental cost of each DG in the presence of attack
is still present, which can be decreased with increase in σ
above 1.
Additionally, a sensitivity analysis is carried out to inspect
detection capabilities of the proposed strategy in Fig. 7 for
different values of ē. A random attack is performed at t
= 2 s on DG II which updates the final settling point for
convergence. It can be seen that with increase in the value of
ē, the transient peak and the settling time to the optimal set-
point keeps increasing. Moreover, to provide resiliency against
input and acquisition noise, ē can not be assigned a very low
value. The design of ē is a deterministic task, which highly
depends on factors such as accuracy and dynamic response.
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis of the proposed event driven attack resilient
mechanism for different values of ē.
Next in scenario I, the performance of the proposed method
in mitigating various types of attack scenarios is presented. In
Scenario I, fault attacks are conducted in the microgrid by
changing the cost parameters of DG I and III at t = 0.5 and 2
s respectively. It can be seen in Fig. 8(a) that the incremental
cost of each DG converges to 7.4 $/W instead of 6.6 $/W
when attack 1 is carried out for the same loading condition.
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Fig. 8. Scenario I - (a) Performance of cooperative microgrid without any attack detection mechanism under fault attacks on DG I and III at t = 0.5 and 2
s respectively, (b) the proposed strategy protects the system from such attacks using local resilient control updates.
Fig. 9. Scenario II - (a) Performance of cooperative microgrid without any attack detection mechanism for random attacks on DG II at t = 2.5 and 4 s for
the same loading condition, (b) the proposed strategy protects the system from such attacks using the localized event held λ̂2.
Further at t = 2 s, attack 2 is conducted on DG III, which
leads to further increase in the incremental cost for the same
active power demand. To defend against such attacks by using
the proposed controller, it can be seen in Fig. 8(b) that the
convergence of λf is unaffected with the inception of attacks.
Moreover, the response of the resilient control update of the
attacked agents, λru1 and λ
ru
3 , immediately go negative to
compensate for the attack elements for their respective DGs.
In Scenario II, random attack is conducted twice on DG
II. At t = 2.5 s, λc2 is initialized to a value of 10 $/W, which
disrupts the optimal operation. As already explained, the attack
element acts as a reference for other DGs, as shown in Fig.
9(a). As a result, λ of the remaining DGs operate to track the
reference. Another attack is initiated at t = 4 s, which sets λc2
to 9.3 $/W. As each DG operate to reach a feasible solution
with λ converging to 9.3 $/W in steady state, the proposed
localized estimation is used to broadcast the event generated
λ̂2 to operate as soon as the event is triggered. To verify the
performance of the controller, it can be seen in Fig. 9(b) that
λ̂2 is held constant during the inception of attack. When ||ρ||
resets back within bounds, the actual value of λ2 is used.
As a result, the localized estimation prevents the system from
going into non-optimal states by using the last sample of active
power measurement before triggering of the local event.
In Scenario III, the performance of the proposed resilient
mechanism is evaluated in case of DG outage. Since the
cooperative control facilitates plug-and-play capability [25],
it is intuitive that the proposed localized resilient mechanism
should operate seamlessly even under the outage of DGs.
Referring to Fig. 10(a), a fault attack (Attack I) on DG III at
t = 1 s resulted in a rise in the incremental cost of each DG.
The active power dispatch from each DG also re-arrange for
the same loading condition. At t = 2 s, DG III is disconnected
from the system with its physical and communication links
disabled. However, the rest of the active network still forms
an undirected graph with an increased incremental cost while
sharing the same demand. Meanwhile, another fault attack
(Attack II) is injected into DG IV at t = 4 s. Upon the launch of
the attack, the incremental cost of each DG further increases.
It can be seen in Fig. 10(b) that the rest of the active network is
fully protected from both of the abovementioned attacks owing
to the proposed resilient mechanism. Since the incremental
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Fig. 10. Scenario III - Performance of cooperative microgrid when DG III is plugged out at t = 2 s. Further, fault attacks are carried out on DG III and IV
for the same loading condition at t = 1 and 4 s respectively : (a) Without any attack resilient mechanism leading to an increase in the incremental costs of
each DG upon attack, (b) the proposed strategy protects the system from such attacks using local resilient control updates.
TABLE II
COST COEFFICIENTS OF DGS IN SCENARIO IV
DG I II III IV V VI
a 0.005 0.0025 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.0035
b 1 0.6 1.8 0.45 1.5 0.9
DG VII VIII IX X XI XII
a 0.005 0.0055 0.0075 0.0038 0.006 0.0075
b 2.7 0.65 1.8 1 2.4 0.72
cost of each DG retains the same value even in the presence
of attacks in Fig. 10(b), a similar behavior can be expected
for the active power dispatch values as well. As a result, the
optimal state of operation is always kept intact even in the
presence of DIAs.
X
XII II
III
VIII VI
XI
IX
IV
V
I
VII
Cyber connections
Electrical connections
Fig. 11. Cyber and electrical connections between N = 12 DGs (Scenario
IV).
In Scenario IV, the performance of the cooperative micro-
grid in the presence of the proposed resilient approach has
been tested for N = 12 DGs to evaluate its scalability. As
shown in Fig. 11, the DGs are electrically connected in a ring
configuration with a similar topology of information exchange
between the neighboring DGs. The cost coefficients of each
DG have been tabulated in Table II. Since the proposed event-
driven resilient mechanism is designed for ith DG only using
the localized error in the cost coefficients (see (33)), it can
Fig. 12. Scenario IV - Performance of cooperative microgrid with N = 12
DGs in the presence of three random attacks at t = 11, 12 and 13.5 sec
respectively to test the scalability of the proposed resilient approach.
be scaled to any number of agents following a spanning tree
cyber connectivity. The spanning tree connectivity provides a
direct measure of convergence in reaching consensus between
the participating agents. As shown in Fig. 12, at t = 11, 12 and
13.5 sec, Attack I, II and III is conducted on DG I, V and IX
respectively, however, the proposed resilient strategy mitigates
the false data element immediately to guarantee optimality
for N agents. Moreover since the computational resources are
distributed across N processors in a cooperative microgrid, the
computational burden is significantly reduced in this case as
compared to the implementation of this strategy for N agents
following centralized communication.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a localized event based attack-resilient
mechanism to defend cooperative microgrids from data in-
tegrity attacks. As these attacks lead to an increase in the gen-
eration cost, they need to be mitigated immediately to prevent
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divergent solutions, which may lead to instability in the worse
cases. Here, an online stealth attack mechanism is presented
for cooperative microgrid using two variants of attacks, namely
fault and random attacks, segregated based on their respective
update behavior in achieving consensus. To deal with fault
attacks, the proposed mechanism provides a localized online
compensation to the changes in cost parameters using a
resilient control update that is designed locally. Whereas for
random attacks, the localized event based incremental cost
is being used via the constantly held measurement before
the attack is conducted. The proposed scheme provides the
following advantages: 1) ability to deal with the correctness of
measurements in each DG without infringing neighbors’ cost
parameters, and 2) capable of operating normally even during
link failure and communication delay, since the mechanism
is localized. A theoretical analysis on the variance of the cost
function with a change in cost parameters is provided to justify
the vulnerability of the system to such attacks and techno-
economic concerns. The proposed scheme has further been
tested for multiple attack scenarios to support the proposed
theory. Finally, the localization of this approach makes it
easily scalable to protect large distribution networks from such
attacks.
APPENDIX
Simulation Parameters
It is worth notifying that the control parameters are consis-
tent for each DG, unless stated otherwise. The inner and outer
control loop gains used in the controller of each DG can be
found in [6].
Plant: R12= 0.23 ohms, L12= 0.000318 H , R23= 0.35 ohms,
L23= 0.001846 H, R34= 1 ohms, L34= 0.001846 H
Controller: m = 0.0014, n = 0.0013, ki = 500, ē = {0.00001,
0.01}, σ = 1.4, Pmin = {0, 0, 0, 0} kW, Pmax = {4, 4, 4,
4} kW.
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